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Abstract. Security, safety and human factors engineering techniques
are largely disconnected although the concepts are interlinked. We present
a tool-supported approach based on the Integrating Requirements and
Information Security (IRIS) framework using Computer Aided Integra-
tion of Requirements and Information Security (CAIRIS) platform to
identify the safety and human factors issues in rail. We illustrate this
approach with a case study, which provides a vehicle for increasing the
existing collaboration between engineers in security, safety and human
factors.
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1 Introduction
As the rail information infrastructure becomes integrated with operational tech-
nology, new vulnerabilities are introduced together with the new threats that
exploit them. As such attacks are directly or indirectly responsible for compro-
mising safety, cyber security has become a new concern for rail safety engineers.
Poor design decisions made during security engineering may lead operators to
make human errors or mistakes where rules are intentionally disobeyed [14],
which may eventually affect system safety. Therefore, rail infrastructures can
only be made safe and secure if along with safety and security, the human fac-
tors engineers contribute to its design and evaluation.
In this paper, we illustrate such an approach where the core concepts from the
Integrating Requirements and Information Security (IRIS) framework are used
to define an intersecting model, based on a proposed relationship between differ-
ent security-by-design and usability techniques. This approach is tool-supported
using the open-source Computer Aided Integration of Requirements and Infor-
mation Security (CAIRIS) platform3.
A key contribution of this work is the use of Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System (HFACS) to augment IRIS framework and CAIRIS plat-
form to identify safety and security issues. This helps rail stakeholders better
3 https://cairis.org
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understand the safety and human factors implications of security concerns, and
also helps discover inter-dependencies between security, safety and human factors
engineering techniques.
In Section 2, we describe the related work upon which our approach is based,
followed by the explanation of our approach in Section 3. We illustrate this ap-
proach with a case study example in Section 4, before concluding and discussing
future directions for our work in Section 5.
2 Related Work
2.1 Security and Safety Challenges in Rail Infrastructure
The rail infrastructure has long been managed in accordance with health and
safety standards, working within legislative requirements such as in United King-
dom the Railway Act 2005, under guidance and supervision from bodies like Rail-
way Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) and Office of Rail Regulation (ORR).
More recently, the shift to digitalisation stipulated by the European Railway
Traffic Management System (ERTMS) imposed by European Union has seen
the introduction of the Common Safety Method for Risk Evaluation and Assess-
ment (CSM-REA) in addition to UK specific safety concepts such as ’As Low
As Reasonably Practicable’ (ALARP) in managing safety risks.
The evolving nature of the cyber threats have imposed a greater challenge
for security experts in rail [12]. As a result, the rail infrastructure needs to be
supported by codes of practice (CoPs) throughout its life cycle as a combination
of security and safety [6]. Security should be infused with safety at a design
phase by ensuring a combined risk assessment approach.
Similarly, the strong linkage between the human intent to violate rules and
imposed safety hazards described by [3] highlights the value of combining safety
with human factors. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
(HFACS) is a framework for eliciting possible accident and incident contribution
factors based on taxonomy of active and latent failures caused by human inter-
actions in rail [17]. The HFACS have been used by rail stakeholders to determine
the human error sources behind accidents and incidents. However, to date, there
has been no work on how it can be used to consider safety or security attributes
of rail system.
2.2 Bridging Security, Safety, and Human Factors
Hazards and accidents may occur due to security breaches, and dependability
– delivering services that can justifiably trusted – encompasses safety and some
major elements of security [5]. Safety is an attribute of dependability, with avail-
ability, reliability, integrity and maintainability; security refers to the availability
and integrity attributes and to confidentiality [13]. Thus the risk factors (prob-
ability of chances of damage) along with the dependability (trust and reliance
on system) are triggered by safety and security issues. Both safety and security
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engineering communities are now working to better bridge their communities
[11], e.g. safety engineering consideration of security mindedness [6].
Previous work has considered human error as an intersecting concept be-
tween cyber security and safety. Humans may cause harm by making mistakes
(active failures) or by inducing errors within system (latent failures) [7], with hu-
man intent as a differentiating factor. If humans are benevolent (unintentional),
they may alert the safety engineers by causing hazards and accidents; if malev-
olent (intentional), they may carry out threats and exploit vulnerabilities that
compromise system security [16], thereby leading to a risk instigating a safety
hazard.
2.3 IRIS and CAIRIS
The Integrating Requirements and Information Security (IRIS) process frame-
work [8] was devised to understand how design concepts associated with secu-
rity, usability, and software engineering could be aligned. It is complemented
by the Computer Aided Integration of Requirements and Information Security
(CAIRIS) platform, which acts as an exemplar for tool-support to manage and
analyse design data collected when applying an IRIS process. IRIS and CAIRIS
have been used in several real-world case studies, including the development of
security policies for critical infrastructure systems [9].
Fig. 1. UML Class Diagram of IRIS
The core IRIS concepts are illustrated in the UML class diagram in Fig. 1.
Vulnerabilities and threats contribute to potential risks, and threats are contin-
gent on attacker’s intent. This intent helps analysts identify the tasks and goals
they carry out or exploit, which can help determine human factors issues in the
form of human errors (active failures). Consequently, although not explicitly de-
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signed with safety in mind, IRIS provides a foundation for integrating security,
safety and human factors.
3 Approach
We have devised an approach based on the IRIS framework, which leverages
security and usability engineering approaches to better understand the safety
implications of rail infrastructure under design. This approach is tool-supported
using CAIRIS. The approach takes input from security and human factors engi-
neers, as well as from rail stakeholders with safety expertise.
3.1 Asset Modelling and their Associations
The approach begins with a security analysis of the system and its environ-
ment by identifying the possible assets [10]. These assets and their relationships
are modelled using UML class diagrams. Each asset is defined in a particular
environment, and categorised by asset types. The security attributes for assets
like confidentiality, integrity, availability are defined and values (Low, Medium,
High) are assigned, based on priorities defined by the rail stakeholders.
3.2 Roles and Attacker Personas
The roles are defined based on stakeholder roles in rail like driver, manager, tick-
eting staff, signaller etc. The roles are further used to identify specific personas
describing the archetypical behaviour of system actors. Attacker personas are
created by following the approach described in [4]; this approach entails using
qualitative data analysis and argumentation models to form the basis of personas
characteristics. Factoids underpinning the personas are elicited by categorising
data about attackers, and thematically analysing these factoids based on affin-
ity groups. CAIRIS facilitates online affinity diagramming, and allows annotated
factoid lists to be imported into CAIRIS as personas characteristic argumenta-
tion models. These argumentation models are based on Toulmin’s model of argu-
mentation, such that each characteristic is justified by one or more grounds that
evidence the persona’s validity, warrants that act as inference rules connecting
the grounds to the characteristic, and rebuttals that act as counterarguments for
the characteristic. A model qualifier is also used to describe the confidence in
the validity of the personas characteristic. Attacker personas narratives are then
specified based on these personas characteristics.
3.3 Vulnerabilities Identification and Threat Modelling
The vulnerabilities are weaknesses of the system, which, if exploited, leads to a
security breach [8]. While identifying vulnerabilities, the assets open to attack
are identified. Personas support this exercise by providing an insight into an
attacker’s mind, given that an attacker’s model of the system may be different
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from a security engineer’s model of the same system. Attacker’s motivation and
capabilities play an important role in threat identification. Tasks and goals ful-
filled by attackers also provide an insight during threat modelling. The threats
identified are assigned security properties based on the goals of attacker.
3.4 Risk Analysis
Vulnerabilities and threats contribute to the identification of potential risks [8].
Using risk analysis, the likelihood and severity of an incident is determined based
on the ability of an attacker, and the value of assets that need to be protected.
CAIRIS generates visual risk models based on this analysis, which are used as
the basis for further analysis.
3.5 Task and Goal-Obstacle Modelling
Based on asset modelling and risk analysis, the concerned tasks and goals are
elicited. These form the basis of system and user level goals. Tasks and goals are
identified from the attacker’s perspective and also form the basis for obstacles
that model obstructions to system goals. Goal and task models can help the
security engineers to better understand the system threat model.
3.6 Identification of Safety Hazards
The risk model generated by CAIRIS determines the safety hazards, by showing
the linkage between the assets with their associated security attributes, vulner-
abilities, emergent threats and the possible risks. The main purpose of this type
of modelling is to identify the possible safeguards to be taken and minimise the
chances of occurrence of any hazardous events.
3.7 Human Factors Analysis
Our approach uses HFACS as a multi-level framework defining human factors
in four main categories [15]: unsafe acts of operations, preconditions for unsafe
acts, unsafe supervision and organizational influences. In lieu of a standardised
methodology for determining the human error sources using HFACS, each vul-
nerability, threat and risk identified as part of threat model is analysed against
the human factors definitions according to HFACS. The value with the closest
possible explanation for human error is labelled as the desired human factors
issue.
4 Case Study - Polish Tram Incident
We illustrate our approach by applying it to a real life incident where a security
breach occurred by exploiting a system vulnerability, leading to the compromise
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of passenger safety4. The 2008 incident was logged as School Boy Hacks into
Polish Tram System in the ‘Repository of Industrial Security Incidents’ [2].
We gathered open source intelligence as an input to our approach. This was
based on several online articles written about the particular Polish Tram Inci-
dent. We supplemented publicly available data with the Operational Concept for
European Railway Traffic Management System (ERTMS); this was used to un-
derstand the system architecture, application levels, operating modes, signalling
principles and control. We also obtained feedback on the emerging CAIRIS model
from safety and human factors experts at Ricardo, who were representative of
the rail stakeholder that might provide input to our approach.
4.1 Asset Modelling and their Associations
Two working environments were defined: Morning and Night shift. The Morning
Shift is based on assumption that it is expected to be much busier in terms of
passenger numbers, compared to operations that take place during Night Shift.
51 assets were identified, based on types of software, hardware, information and
people. Assets were modelled by taking an attacker’s perspective of the tram
system, thus helping the security engineers to understand the relevant vulner-
abilities. Asset modelling was not limited to the early stages of the process; at
later stages asset associations were also defined. For instance, during attacker
personas definition three assets namely Infrared Remote Control, Public Libraries
and Internet Codes were identified. These assets formed the basis for determin-
ing the capabilities of an attacker who learned the coding for building infrared
remote control from the Internet.
4.2 Roles and Attacker Personas
The analysis about the rail infrastructure lead to the recognition of 11 roles.
The most notable was the role of Attacker. Based on online articles and incident
records, we concluded that the attacker did not wish to intentionally cause harm.
Instead, attacks were exploratory in nature with no consideration given to the
consequences. The role of attacker further motivated us to understand the intent
and capability behind the cyber attack with the help of personas.
We created an attacker persona Adam based on relevant sources for the Pol-
ish Tram Incident, which provided different perspectives of the incident. Adam
was built based on 18 argumentation models used to specify 18 complementary
personas characteristics, underpinned by 47 factoids. For example, the persona
characteristic Working Knowledge about Railways describes how Adam gained
access to the rail network based on his skills and knowledge; he recorded and
replayed signals using a universal remote control. Based on this, we identified
a system vulnerability, i.e., the 1970s Switching System on which Poland Tram
System was operating, and the subsequent threat of Unauthorised Access into
Poland Railway Signalling System.
4 The final model created, including references to online sources used, is available
from: https://bit.ly/2KSocEg
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4.3 Vulnerabilities Identification and Threat Modelling
By exploring the attacker motives, 4 vulnerabilities were identified namely, Poor
Architectural Design and Lack of Risk Assessment, 1970s Switching System, Re-
ported Problems with Signalling System and Fautly Track Points. These vulner-
abilities were responsible for compromising the security of 6 assets.
We also identified 3 threats: Poland Railway Network Intrusion, Replay At-
tack and Switch Splitting. The anticipation of possible threats and cyber-attacks
at design level is the work of security engineers, but considering Adam’s perspec-
tive helped identify exploitable vulnerabilities. For example, the threat Poland
Railway Network Intrusion was based on our interpretation of Adam’s ability to
exploit Faulty Track Points.
4.4 Risk Analysis
Within an environment of Morning Shift, 4 risks were defined using vulnerabil-
ities and threats. These form the basis of the risk analysis, the results of which
are illustrated in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Risk Modelling in CAIRIS
The threat of Switch Splitting based on vulnerability of Faulty Track Points,
could lead to risk of Train Derailment. On the basis of this risk, security design
decisions that minimise the chances of occurrence of this risk can be taken. The
risk analysis also contributed towards the better understanding of visible safety
hazards and human factors issues based on their occurrence and likelihood ratios.
4.5 Task and Goal-Obstacle Modelling
The narrative of attacker personas formed the basis for responsibility modelling
which comprised of identification of 4 tasks performed by attacker to conduct the
cyber-attack. Adam learned coding skills from his class and the internet before
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he built an infrared device by modifying a universal remote control. Adam used
that infrared device to record signals and replayed them to switch track points.
The completion of these tasks lead to the satisfaction of system goals (Modify
TV Remote Control, Access Railway Network and Redirect Railway Trams) on
the part of attacker.
The attack was conducted by exploiting system loop-holes. The exploitation
of these loop-holes were active failures on the part of security engineers. For
example, the vulnerability Reported Problems with Signalling System led to the
human factors issue of Violations as the operation and performance of signalling
system was not compliant with secured protocols and standards. This allowed
the attacker to perform the task of Record Signals, fulfilling the system goal
Access Railway Network. In this case, the major security goal defined by security
engineers which would have acted as an obstacle for attacker would have been
the use of Advanced Train Control Protocol System which would have denied
Adam an unauthorised access into the railway network. Thus, it would have
mitigated the cyber-attack, and ensured the safety of passengers.
4.6 Identification of Safety Hazards
For explanation purposes, we consider the risk of Switching of Railways Junc-
tions that is due to the threat of Replay Attacks. The realisation of this risk
might cause Collisions between two or even more than two trains, which com-
promises the safety of passengers and staff present in train. Table 1 represents the
identification of potential safety hazards from risk modelling elements (vulnera-
bilities, threats, risks) based on the Risk Assessment Log presented by Randstad
Rail [1]. The documentation of Randstad Rail includes the activities and tasks
in the railway sector which may lead to catastrophic hazards. The identified
risks were used to categorise these safety hazards. Knowledge of these poten-
tial safety hazards is helpful for alerting safety engineers dealing with critical
infrastructures.
4.7 Human Factors Analysis
Table. 1 shows how the vulnerabilities, threats and risks identified can be cate-
gorised to determine the human factors issues based on HFACS along with safety
hazards. These human factors issues also help us to verify the system usability
for risks, by the satisfaction of user goals depending on certain procedures, com-
petencies, permissions and training needs analysis (TNA) to achieve those goals
and complete defined tasks.
For example, the risk of Injury of Railway Staff or Passenger which is linked
to threat of Poland Railway Network Intrusion, may lead to safety hazard of Loss
of Life. In this case, the human factors issue observed using the HFACS frame-
work is the poor design of Technological Environment due to Poor Architectural
Design and Lack of Risk Assessment, which has life-threatening consequences.
This illustrates how the timely evaluation of technological environment using
checklists and task factors can minimise the chances of risk occurrence.
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Table 1. Human Factors Issues based on HFACS
Vulnerabilities Threats Associated Risks Safety Hazards Human Factors
Faulty Track Points Switch Splitting Train Derailment
Life Threatening for
Staff and Passengers
in Train as well as
near Train
Failed to Correct
Known Problems
Reported Problems
with Signalling System
Replay Attack
Switching of
Railway Junctions
Collision (Between
Two Trains or Even
More Than Two
Trains)
Violations
Poland Tram System
Working on 1970s
Switching System
Poland Railway Network
Intrusion Threat
Unauthorised Access into
the Poland Railway
Signalling System
Disruption of Train
Services or
Emergency Stop
Inadequate
Supervision
Poor Architectural
Design and Lack
of Risk Assessment
Poland Railway Network
Intrusion Threat
Injury of Railway
Staff or Passengers
Loss of Life
Technological
Environment
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a tool-support approach for identifying safety and
human factor issues, based on core concepts from IRIS and CAIRIS. The scien-
tific novelty has been the methodological application to safety and human factors
engineering in rail. We carried out a preliminary evaluation of this approach by
applying it to a case study where inter-dependencies between safety, security,
and human factors were present. In doing so, we have made three contributions.
First, our approach shows how asset modelling and their associations, can be
used to identify security attributes namely, confidentiality, integrity, availability
of assets as prioritised by rail stakeholders. Second, we have shown how building
models of attackers not only rationalises attacker assumptions, but also helps to
identify system vulnerabilities. Both lead to the identification of threats which,
with the support of scenarios, rationalises risks and the identification of sev-
eral safety hazards. On the basis of these hazards, root causes of active failures
(human errors) like violations and inadequate supervision could be determined
using HFACS. Finally, we have shown how building the personas for other roles
like driver and signaller helps rail stakeholders determine the task scenarios in
more detail. These task scenarios can be used by human factors engineers to
inform hierarchical and cognitive task analysis which can predict the reliability
of systems in different environments.
We are evaluating our approach on a project where the representative rail
stakeholders will be closely involved when considering the risks, roles, tasks,
goals, requirements, dependencies and obstacles between the humans and sys-
tems. In future work, we will present a refined process-framework based on best
practices from safety, security and human factors engineering. For this purpose,
further categorisation of tasks at system, design or operator levels using ERTMS
specifications may have the potential to determine broader design weaknesses.
A more thorough task analysis exercise could provide more detailed insights
into human factors, and subsequent security and safety concerns. The resultant
process-framework will be translated into tool-support for implementation in rail
and other critical infrastructures.
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